This study introduces financial intermediaries into the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) . They collect deposits from households, provide funds for entrepreneurial projects, and monitor the entrepreneurs. show that financial intermediaries need to monitor entrepreneurs in an economy where the legal protection of creditors is not strong enough. Such monitoring can resolve the moral hazard problem; however, it does not always promote technological innovation, because it could increase the cost of entrepreneurial innovation and thus reduce the amount invested for innovation. I also examine how monitoring by financial intermediaries affects the welfare of individuals through the stringency of financial markets.
diaries on economic growth in the long run. 4 My model is based on Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), which considers an economy with asymmetric information where borrowers do not repay their obligations but pay a cost to hide their true revenues, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . 5 In this study, I construct a model with moral hazard problems induced by entrepreneurs, following the idea of a hidden cost in Aghion et al. (2005) . Moreover, I incorporate the idea of a private benefit, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997) . In Holmström and Tirole (1997) , a moral hazard 4 Boyd and Smith (1994) consider how a debt contract can lower the monitoring costs, but their framework is static. Diamond (1984) and Holmström and Tirole (1997) focus on the link between the level of monitored finance and the level of investment, but their frameworks are also static. 5 The cost is called a hidden cost in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) ; it is taken as the degree of creditor protection in Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
problem exists in that borrowers can obtain a private benefit by not managing their project diligently. They show that in an economy with the moral hazard problem, the monitoring level can affect aggregate production and alleviate the moral hazard; however, their model is static and thus cannot analyze the effects of monitoring on economic growth in the long run.
Therefore, one of the contributions of this study is examining a similar issue in a dynamic framework, that is, lower monitoring cost; in other words, this study examines whether higher monitoring technology of financial intermediaries can accelerate economic growth by lowering the cost of raising funds for entrepreneurs. I also show that in an economy where the legal protection of creditors is sufficiently high, financial intermediaries do not have to monitor entrepreneurs, and the equilibrium level of innovation in this economy is the same as in the economy with no moral hazard problems.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. In Section 3, I first consider an economy without moral hazard problems as the benchmark, and then an economy with moral hazard problems. The section analyzes the link between legal protection of the creditor and the role of financial intermediaries. The effects of financial intermediaries' monitoring on economic growth are also analyzed. Section 4
shows the results of Section 3 graphically and provides their implications. Section 5 performs welfare analyses. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
The Model

Environment
I develop a discrete-time multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model where financial intermediaries collect deposits from households, provide funds for entrepreneurial projects, and 6 One of the studies examining the legal system and financial development is La Porta et al. (2000) ; the study takes the view that differences in the legal system are the fundamental source of international differences in financial development. 
Final Goods Sector
Final goods, Z t , are produced from labor and a continuum of specialized intermediate goods according to the following production function:
where 
Intermediate Goods Sector
From (4) and (2), the quantity demanded for intermediate good i becomes
9 The condition for innovators to enjoy the cost of production advantage is the following limit-price constraint: p i,t ≤ χ 10 In the absence of a competitive fringe, when Thus, the profit of entrepreneurs in the intermediate goods sector i, π i,t , can be given by
where π = (χ − 1)
Aggregate Behavior
This subsection aggregates economic activities. I define the average level of technological productivity, A t , as
Substituting (5) and (7) into production function (1), the aggregate output becomes
Since perfect competition prevails in the final goods sector, the wage rate, w t , is equal to the marginal product of labor in producing the final good, and is proportional to A t :
In equilibrium, the probability of successful innovation is the same across sectors: µ i,t = µ t for all i. Therefore, the law of motion of average productivity becomes
Equation (10) reveals that the average technological productivity of an economy in period t is a weighted average of the µ t sectors that implement the world frontier technology, A t , and the 1 − µ t sectors that use the average technology in period t-1, A t−1 .
I define technology gap as the distance from the world technology frontier:
closed to the world technology frontier, A t . 13 From (10) and (11), the technology gap evolves according to
where g is the growth rate of the world frontier technology, A t .
Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are born with endowment ω f > 0 in period t-1. Their net worth
It is assumed that ω f is not enough to provide funds for the entrepreneurs and monitor them, and so financial intermediaries need to collect deposits from households.
After they collect deposits from the households, they invest their own net worth as well as the deposits received by providing funds for the entrepreneurs who have a positive probability of innovation or by holding risk-free assets.
14 Thus, their balance sheet condition can be given by
where L 15 If the financial intermediaries hold risk-free assets B t−1 in period t-1, they would have (1 + r)B t−1 assets in period t. 13 Note that a t ∈ [0, 1]. 14 I assume a small open economy, and so financial intermediaries can invest abroad at the rate of return, r, which is given. 15 Note that µ t is the proportion of sectors where innovation is successful and financial intermediaries agree not to claim payment if the entrepreneurs, that is, the borrowers, fail to innovate.
Since the financial market and world capital market are efficient, financial intermediaries would require that the expected return rate on funds provided to entrepreneurs be equal to the return rate on their risk-free asset holdings in case there is no moral hazard problem.
Thus, the no-arbitrage condition in an economy with no moral hazard problem can be given by
I consider the following moral hazard problem. Entrepreneurs who are provided with funds may cheat the financial intermediaries by not repaying the loan once they successfully innovate. This moral hazard problem can be resolved if financial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs; however, it costs mL f t−1 to monitor entrepreneurs when the financial intermediaries lend them L f t−1 .
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Let ρ = {0, 1} be the probability that financial intermediaries can obtain repayment. If the financial intermediaries monitor the borrowers, they obtain repayment with the probability ρ = 1. Otherwise, they obtain repayment with the probability 0.
If financial intermediaries monitor the borrowers, since both the financial market and world capital market are efficient, the markets would require that the expected return rate on funds provided for the entrepreneurs,
, be equal to the return rate on the risk-free asset holdings,
. In equilibrium, ρ = 1 if financial intermediaries monitor the borrowers. Thus, the no-arbitrage condition in an economy with the moral hazard problem and financial intermediaries' monitoring can be given by
Because of perfect competition between financial intermediaries, the following zero-profit conditions hold:
If financial intermediaries decide to monitor the entrepreneurs in period t-1, they have to borrow the monitoring cost, mL f t−1 , in the world capital market in period t-1, and repay
(1 + r)mL f t−1 in period t.
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If the financial intermediaries do not monitor the entrepreneurs, the balance sheet condition (13), the no-arbitrage condition (14) , and the zero-profit condition (16) yield the following gross return for deposits, R 
If the financial intermediaries do monitor the entrepreneurs, the balance sheet condition (13), the no-arbitrage condition (15) , and the zero-profit condition (17) yield the following gross return for deposits, R 
Assume the following rule of the lending to net worth ratio,
Households
The economy is populated by a fixed number L of identical households, and L is normalized to 1. The households live for two periods, and are endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically in the first period. The households consume the final goods in the first and second periods, with the following utility function:
17 Since I assume a small open economy, the risk-free rate, r, is exogenous. 18 Under rule (20) , the return for deposits determined by (19) is larger than 1 + r, which is the return on risk-free asset holdings. Then, households can save only by having deposits with financial intermediaries, whether or not the financial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs. For the derivation of (19) and (20) 
The first-order condition of the household's maximization problem is
Using (9), I can rewrite (24) as
Innovation
The probability of an entrepreneur successfully innovating in period t, µ t , depends on the amount of funds invested in innovation during period t-1 :
Here, N i,t−1 is the amount of funds invested in innovation during period t-1 : that is, the demand for funds; θ is a parameter reflecting the institutional and other characteristics that affect the cost of innovation at every level of technology; and γ is the inverse of the R&D 19 The utility function is specified to be of log-utility type, since it is tractable for analyses. 20 In equilibrium, R 
Equilibrium Innovation without Moral Hazard
In this subsection, I consider an economy that has no moral hazard problems. To put it in another way, all the entrepreneurs in this economy decide not to privately use the funds borrowed from financial intermediaries and therefore repay the financial intermediaries.
23
In this economy, each entrepreneur whose idea has a positive probability of successful innovation chooses the amount of R&D investment N i,t−1 to maximize her expected profits 
where
The first term in the parentheses in (27), πA t , gives the monopolistic profits of producing an intermediate good. The second term, R f t N i,t−1 , gives the amount that she has to pay the financial intermediary. The corresponding first-order condition yields
Equation (29) implies that any increase in the cost of raising funds, R f t , reduces the R&D investment, N i,t−1 . Because of (28), Equation (29) can be rewritten as follows:
In equilibrium, the cost of raising funds becomes the same across sectors:
Thus, the probability of innovation becomes the same across sectors: µ i,t = µ t for all i. The equilibrium return for lending, R f * , is determined so as to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition (14) and the entrepreneur's optimization condition (30). Thus, I obtain
By substituting R f * into optimization conditions (29) and (30), I obtain the equilibrium amount of R&D investment N * t−1 and the equilibrium probability of successful innovation µ * as follows:
where it is assumed that βπ < (1 + γ)θ γ in order to ensure that µ * ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, the entrepreneur's profits, Π e * t , can be written as
From (33) and (12), the technology gap in this economy with no moral hazard evolves according to
where a t converges in the long run to the steady state:
Equilibrium Innovation with Moral Hazard
In this subsection, I describe an economy that has moral hazard problems. Assume that after the entrepreneurs are provided with funds for R&D investment by financial intermediaries, they can decide whether to use all the funds, L 
The right-hand side of (37) is equal to Equation (34), which gives the entrepreneurs' expected profits in equilibrium when there is no moral hazard problem and they use all the funds for investment. The left-hand side of (37) is the entrepreneurs' expected profits when they do not use all the funds for investment in period t-1. The first term on the left-hand side of (37) implies the entrepreneurs' expected benefit when their innovation is unsuccessful in period t, 27 while the second term of the left-hand side of (37) implies the entrepreneurs' expected benefit when their innovation is successful and they earn monopolistic profits but do not 24 When entrepreneurs privately use a part of the funds, the amount of investments decrease. From (26), the probability of successful innovation when they privately use a part of the funds is lower than that when they use all the funds for investments. 25 This assumption of private benefit is based on Holmström and Tirole (1997) . 26 This assumption of a hidden cost is based on Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
27 Note that β is a discount factor, (1 −μ t ) is the probability of unsuccessful innovation when the amount of investment isN t−1 , and qN * t−1 is a private benefit.
repay the financial intermediaries in period t.
From (26), (32), (33), and (34), Equation (37) can be rewritten as
(IC) is satisfied when q is close to 1, because γ > 1 and β < 1. 29 When q is close to 1, entrepreneurs can divert a larger part of funds, but since the hidden cost is high, they lose the incentive to divert. An increase in q has two effects: one, it increases the private benefit the entrepreneurs obtain when their innovation is unsuccessful, and two, it increases the hidden cost to be dishonest when their innovation is successful. Since entrepreneurs use a large part of funds privately and the quantities of investment decrease when q is close to 1, the probability of successful innovation decreases. Therefore, the latter effect is larger than the former effect and they lose the incentive to use funds privately when q is close to 1. The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1 The case in which legal protection is sufficiently high:
If the degree of creditor protection is sufficiently high, that is, the hidden cost q is close to 1, financial intermediaries do not need to monitor the entrepreneurs since the incentive constraint is satisfied. The equilibrium in this case is the same as that in the economy with no moral hazard problem. Consequently, if the degree of creditor protection is sufficiently high, that is, the hidden cost q is close to 1, the amount of investment, the probability of successful innovation, the dynamics of technology gap, and the steady state of the technology gap in the
28 Note thatμ t is the probability of successful innovation when the amount of investment isN t−1 and πA t represents the monopolistic profits given by (6) . 29 When q is close to 1, the left-hand side of (IC) is close to β and the right-hand side of (IC) is γ. Note that γ > 1 and β < 1. Now, the incentive compatibility condition is satisfied when q is close to 1. On the other hand, when q is close to 0, the left-hand side of (IC) is close to 1+γ and the right-hand side of (IC) is γ.
Because the left-side of (IC) is strictly larger than the right-hand side, the incentive compatibility condition is not satisfied when q is close to 0.
equilibrium with no monitoring are, respectively,
I next consider the case where the degree of creditor protection is not sufficiently high, that is, q is close to 0. In order to enable financial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs, the following inequality must hold:
This inequality implies that financial intermediaries have an incentive to monitor when the return on lending as promised is larger than the cost of monitoring. Thus, inequality (38) is satisfied for all m, since the no-arbitrage condition (15) is satisfied in equilibrium. The maximization problem for entrepreneurs under monitoring by financial intermediaries is the same as that under no monitoring by financial intermediaries in (27). Thus, in this case, the optimizing conditions for entrepreneurs are the same as in (29) and (30). In equilibrium, the probability of innovation is the same across all sectors: µ i,t = µ t for all i; the no-arbitrage condition (15) holds; and the entrepreneurs' optimization condition (30) is satisfied. Thus, the return for lending, R f , in the equilibrium with monitoring can be given by
Equation (39) implies that this equilibrium return for lending, R f , is higher than that with no monitoring, R f * . 30 This result comes from the no-arbitrage condition (15) . Moreover, as the monitoring cost, m, increases, this equilibrium return for lending, R f , increases as well.
30 Note that R f * is given by (31).
By substituting R f into the optimization conditions (29) and (30), I can obtain the equilibrium amount of R&D investment, N t−1 , and the equilibrium probability of successful innovation,μ, as follows:
I obtain the second equality of (40) from (32) and the second equality of (41) from (33). In the equilibrium with monitoring, the entrepreneur's profits, Π e t , is
From (41) and (12), in the economy with no moral hazard, the technology gap evolves according to
where a t converges in the long run to the following steady state:
The following property establishes those of the steady-state technology gap when financial intermediaries monitor the entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 The technology gap in an economy with monitoring a t−1 converges to the
steady stateã, which is always less than a * .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that monitoring by financial intermediaries can enforce repayment when innovation is successful, but there remains the moral hazard problem that entrepreneurs may privately use a part of the funds to obtain a private benefit when their innovation is unsuccessful.
31 Since I assume that βπ < (1 + γ)θ γ so that µ * ∈ (0, 1) and m > 0, I ensure that µ ∈ [0, 1).
Nevertheless, in the equilibrium with monitoring, no moral hazard problems arise. The following proposition summarizes this argument. 
The following lemma establishes the properties of equilibrium innovation in the economy with monitoring.
Lemma 1 Properties of the equilibrium innovation in the economy with monitoring:
32 In Appendix B, I show that when financial intermediaries monitor, the incentive constraint is satisfied for all q. Thus, even if the degree of creditor protection is not sufficiently high, that is, q is close to 0, no moral hazard problems arise in the equilibrium with monitoring.
• 
• The following proposition establishes the properties of the steady-state technology gap when there is monitoring by financial intermediaries.
Proposition 4 The economy with monitoring stagnates if the financial intermediaries' monitoring technology is too low:
Proof. By differentiating (44) with respect toμ, I obtain
This implies thatã is increasing atμ. From the lemma, I obtain ∂μ ∂m < 0. First, when the monitoring cost, m, is low, the cost of raising funds, R f , is also low. This boosts the amount demanded for funds, N , and the probability of successful innovation,μ.
When the probability of successful innovationμ is high, the steady-state technology gap level, a, becomes correspondingly higher. By the definition of a t , (11) 
Dynamics
This section investigates the properties of the dynamic system. Consider an economy with financial intermediaries' monitoring.
The model economy's technology gap a t−1 evolves according to the dynamic system H 2 (a t−1 ) (43) when the degree of creditor protection q is close to 0 and there is financial intermediary monitoring. This dynamic system is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 .
Note that H 2 (a t−1 ) is a linear function with slope between 0 and 1 and the vertical intercept isμ. Lemma 1 implies that the lower the monitoring cost, m, the higher is the equilibrium probability of successful innovation,μ. From Proposition 4, whenμ increases, the vertical intercept of H 2 (a t−1 ) rises and the slope of H 2 (a t−1 ) declines. Consequently, when financial intermediaries face a lower monitoring cost, the system H 2 (a t−1 ) shifts upward in Figure 1 , and the steady state of the technology gap,ã, becomes correspondingly higher. Thus, when 33 The relation between monitoring investment and economic growth is discussed in Levine (2005) . Consequently, when financial intermediaries face a sufficiently high monitoring cost, the system H 2 (a t−1 ) shifts downward in Figure 2 , and the steady state of the technology gap,ã, becomes correspondingly lower. This lower steady state of the technology gap does not stem from the credit constraints in the model with no financial intermediary monitoring. In this study, it stems from the financial intermediaries' monitoring activities.
Welfare Effects of Financial Intermediaries' Monitoring
In the previous section, I showed that increases in monitoring cost impede innovation and economic growth. In this section, I examine the welfare effect of financial intermediaries' First, consider the welfare effect on households in the economy with monitoring. Households supply one unit of labor at the wage rate w t , which is used to finance their consumption.
Since perfect competition prevails in the final goods sector, the wage rate w t is equal to the marginal product of labor in producing the final good. Thus, in the equilibrium, the wage rate can be given by
The wage rate increases as the technology gap a t increases. From Proposition 4, any increase in monitoring cost lowers the technology gap a t , since it leads to stringency in the financial market and so impedes innovation. Hence, increases in monitoring cost lead to lower wage rates and thus worsen the welfare of households.
In each intermediate goods sector, only one entrepreneur can raise funds from financial intermediaries and invest for innovation. Moreover, the proportion of the sectors where innovation is successful is µ t . Since the successful innovators can earn monopoly profit, πA t , and the other entrepreneurs earn zero profit, from Equation (6), the profit earned by all the entrepreneurs in the economy can be shown as
Note that µ t = µ * = In summary, although financial intermediaries pay a monitoring cost in each period, both the goods market and the financial market take on the burden of monitoring costs and then any increase in monitoring cost worsens the welfare of households as well as entrepreneurs. Some studies examine the effect of the financial system on innovation and economic growth, 
Thus, I assume rule (20) .
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In the case with monitoring, the incentive constraint is
The right-hand side of (46) is equal to Equation (42), which is the entrepreneurs' expected profits in equilibrium with the moral hazard problem when they use all the funds for investment under monitoring. The left-hand side of (46) is the entrepreneurs' expected profits when they do not use all the funds for investment in period t-1. The first term of the left-hand side of (46) implies the entrepreneurs' expected benefit when their innovation is unsuccessful in period t, whereas the second term implies the entrepreneurs' expected benefit when their innovation is successful and they earn monopolistic profits, repaying the financial intermediaries in period t. 36 Equation (46) can be rewritten as
The left-hand side of (47) is less than 1 since q ∈ (0, 1), γ > 1, andμ < 1. The right-hand side of (47) is larger than 1 since γ > 1 and mβ > 1. Thus, I obtain
Hence, in the equilibrium with monitoring, incentive constraint (47) is satisfied for all q. 36 Note that β is a discount factor, (1 −μ t ) q N t−1 implies that (1 −μ t ) is the probability of unsuccessful innovation when the amount of investment isN t−1 and q N t−1 is a private benefit,μ t is the probability of successful innovation when the amount of investment isN t−1 , πA t is given by (6) , and R f N t−1 is the cost of lending, where R f is given by (39).
C Proof of the second part of Proposition 3
Proof.ã = 
